Woodruff, Michael L. (2019) Sentience is the foundation of animal rights. Animal
Sentience 23(18)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1394

Date of submission: 2019-02-01
Date of acceptance: 2019-02-15

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2019.180: Woodruff on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference

Sentience is the foundation of animal rights
Commentary on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference

Michael L. Woodruff
Biomedical Sciences
East Tennessee State University
Abstract: Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and
nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domaingeneral cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the
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1. Introduction
The title of the target article asks the question “Why do we want to think humans are different?”
(italics added). Inclusion of the verb want implies the meaning “What is the motivation to hold
the belief that humans are different?” This is an important question, but it is not the main
question that Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H) address. Rather they address the question: Do
we have evidence to think that humans have traits that are unique in ways that make them
superior to animals? Their answer to this question is no. In defense of their answer, they argue
that “many of our previous criteria for human uniqueness have proved wrong.” They provide
three supporting examples — tool use, the use of medicine and the erection of complex
structures.
2. Humans are cognitively unique because they possess domain-general ability
As C & H note, other items could be added to this list. Behaviors reminiscent of human religious
ritual such as troop-wide vocal responses to the setting and rising sun by baboons, and
chimpanzees who adorn themselves with bits of vegetation while engaging in “ritualized” group
movement (Wulff, 1997, pp. 147-154) come to my mind. The observation that cats and meercats
teach their young (Premack, 2010) is also relevant. However, even adding these examples, I still
find C & H’s argument unconvincing unless they present evidence that animals have domaingeneral cognitive abilities. In this I follow Premack (2007; 2010) who observed that the behavioral
repertoire of humans is far more extensive and flexible than that of animals even within
behavioral categories they share. He summarized this position as follows: “Humans command all
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cognitive abilities, and all of them are domain general, whereas animals, by contrast, command
very few abilities, and all of them are adaptations restricted to a single goal or activity” (Premack
2010, p. 30). Hence, humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that render them superior in
the ability to react to challenges from our physical and social environments in ways that, for better
or worse, result in complex impacts on the world that are qualitatively different from those
caused by any other species.
3. The false analogy between the rights of humans and animals
C & H inadvertently provide an example of uniquely human domain-general cognitive abilities.
When the Constitution of the United States was written, the human rights enumerated therein
were denied to Blacks of both sexes and to white women. Part of the rationale for this exclusion
was the belief that white men were intellectually superior to Blacks and women.
African Americans and women are no longer categorized as intellectually inferior and are
afforded equal rights as citizens. C & H imply that just as these “categorizations have changed
dramatically over time” for African Americans and women, the categorization of animals as
inferior will change with the consequence that a broader spectrum of rights will be afforded to
them. This analogy fails to recognize the crucial role played by the “vaunted intellect,
communication skills, and morality” of members of the presumed “inferior” group — such as
Frederick Douglass; Martin Luther King, Jr.; Susan B. Anthony; and Betty Friedan — in effecting
this change. Unless I have missed something, the Thomas Jefferson of bonobos has yet to produce
a document proclaiming the inalienable rights of animals. Other behavioral traits may also
distinguish humans from animals, but I suggest that the ability to conceive of and articulate a
claim of rights is unique to humans and a definitive behavioral indicator of human cognitive
superiority.
4. Sentience, not cognitive complexity, entails the obligation to extend rights to animals
I reject C & H’s claim that humans do not have certain qualitatively unique cognitive traits that
give them, in comparison to animals, superior ability to alter the world in novel and ingenious
ways. However, I also reject that this human-animal difference excludes, as the philosopher Carl
Cohen (1986) contended, animals from being part of our moral community and, thereby, from
possessing rights.
Sentience, the ability to experience different feelings such as suffering or pleasure, not
cognitive complexity, is the essential characteristic required for granting rights to an animal
species. There is a substantial literature indicating that sentience extends to animals at least as
distantly removed evolutionarily from humans as bony fish (e.g., Sneddon et al., 2018; Woodruff,
2017; 2018). I believe it is a human moral imperative that the rights of all sentient beings be
protected. Because animals, unlike humans, cannot gain this protection by their own efforts, it is
our responsibility to apply our “vaunted intellect, communication skills, and morality” to using
this literature to advocate for them. In this C & H and I agree, as does Juergens (2018) who closes
her commentary on the target article with the pointed sentence: “If we pride ourselves on our
unique intellect, we ought to also pride ourselves on assuming the responsibility that comes with
it” (p. 3).
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